U.S. Supreme Court Levels Playing Field for Reverse Discrimination Claims: Understanding the Impact of Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

October 10, 2025
  1. Introduction

Reverse discrimination claims—allegations that an employer discriminated against a member of a majority group—have gained popularity and notoriety in recent years. While reverse discrimination claims are nothing new, having been recognized by the United States Supreme Court under Title VII by at least 1971, they are less common than traditional discrimination claims. However, these cases require the same careful attention to documentation, uniformity, and legal standards. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025) reshaped the legal landscape around reverse discrimination claims, creating uniform standards for both traditional and reverse discrimination claims, signaling to employers the importance of considering all forms of discrimination in ensuring Title VII compliance and mitigating potential liability. When Title VII’s disparate treatment provision[1] says it prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it means it prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of any race, any color, anyreligion, anysex, or any national origin, regardless of the claimant belongs to a historically disadvantaged group.

  1. The Ames Case.

Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, was hired by the Ohio Department of Youth Services to serve as an executive secretary, before being promoted to program administrator.[2] In 2019, Ames “applied for a newly created management position in the agency’s Office of Quality Improvement.”[3] Ames was interviewed the position, but the agency hired a lesbian woman to fill the role instead.[4] Soon after, Ames was demoted back to her secretary position, resulting in a significant pay cut.[5] Ames’ program administrator role was filled by a gay man.[6] Ames filed a Title VII claim against the agency, asserting that the agency prioritized diversity to her detriment, promoting less-qualified LGBTQ employees and demoting her because she was straight.

For decades, many federal courts, including in the Eighth Circuit, have required majority-group plaintiffs to show “background circumstances” indicating that an employer was atypical or especially likely to discriminate against the majority,[7] or imposed other barriers to majority-group Title VII claimants.[8] This meant reverse discrimination claims faced extra barriers at the outset of a case, differing from the standard applied to traditional Title VII claims. In Ames, the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the “background circumstances” test to Ames’ claim, and found that Ames did not show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the [agency] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”[9] The Court of Appeals explained that the background circumstances test is typically satisfied by showing that “a member of the relevant minority group . . . made the employment decision at issue” or by showing a statistical “pattern of discrimination . . . against members of the majority group.”[10]

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected the background circumstances test, ruling that Title VII makes no distinction between classic discrimination and reverse discrimination. Title VII’s disparate treatment provision, the Court said, “draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.”[11] The Court pointed to other cases demonstrating that Title VII establishes “the same protections for every ‘individual’—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group . . .” including Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), where the Court said that “[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed” and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), where the Court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination against white plaintiffs “upon the same standards” that would apply to racial minority groups.[12]  The Court concluded that Title VII does not impose a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs.[13] Consequently, all parties—majority or minority group members—now proceed under the same evidentiary framework in court, and are reviewed with the same legal rigor.

  1. Analyzing Discrimination Cases After Ames: Uniform Application of the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework.

Before Ames, employers and courts where the background circumstances test was applied often viewed “reverse discrimination” with a presumption that it was less probable or more difficult to prove. In light of Ames, it is important that all forms of discrimination, no matter whom the discrimination is alleged by, are analyzed and considered equally, using the standard and hopefully familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.[14] Under McDonnell Douglas, a claimant under Title VII must establish “‘a prima facie case’ by producing enough evidence to support an interference of discriminatory motive.”[15] This is often a simple hurdle to clear, requiring an employee to present “evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”[16] Ames makes it clear that this showing is all that is required in every case. Once the plaintiff presents the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection” and if the employer does so, the employee has the opportunity to show that the justification was merely pretext for discrimination.[17]

Ames does not add to or change the McDonnell Douglas framework as it is generally understood. Ames merely takes away an additional hurdle added for members of a majority group who claimed discrimination. Under Ames, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is applied uniformly and equally to all claims of discrimination.

  1. Reverse Discrimination Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

            Minnesota Courts analyze employment discrimination claims under the MHRA using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.[18] While some Minnesota state courts have applied the background circumstances test to reverse discrimination claims under the MHRA,[19] the MHRA’s provisions preventing discrimination have long been seen as neutral, preventing discrimination against both majority and minority groups.[20] Like Title VII, the MHRA’s prohibition on employment discrimination provides inclusive protections, and does not distinguish between majority and minority groups.[21] Accordingly, Minnesota courts are unlikely to apply the background circumstances test moving forward, consistent with most prior state court decisions, the MHRA’s neutral language, and Minnesota’s adoption of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, as that framework is now applied under Ames.

  • Key Takeaways and Best Practices.

DEI:                The Ames decision comes at a time when diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs are under increasing scrutiny, in part based on reverse-discrimination type claims.[22] Ames emphasizes the need to ensure fair opportunities to all groups. As DEI programs are reworked and reconsidered, it is important to keep Ames and the level playing field for all forms of discrimination in mind. Employers must consider not only minority groups, but also majority groups, to ensure that decisions are not made based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any way.

Policies:          When reviewing anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, ensure the policies use neutral language, highlighting protection for all employees. Any language which suggests that majority-group complaints are less credible or harder to pursue should be removed.

Training:       Update HR and management training to reflect the Ames standard. Persons tasked with investigating discrimination complaints and enforcing anti-discrimination policies should be instructed that all discrimination claims—regardless of the claimant’s group status—should receive the same treatment and documentation, and be analyzed under the same standard.


[1] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)

[2] Ames, 605 U.S. at 306.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] See, e.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985); Mudrich v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1024 (D. Minn. 2013); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

[8] Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158–161 (3rd Cir. 1999) (collecting cases)

[9] Ames, 605 U.S. at 307 (citation modified).

[10] Id. (citation modified).

[11] Id. at 309.

[12] Id. at 310.

[13] Id. at 313.

[14] In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, criticized the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework, particularly at the summary judgment stage, but it remains the standard, at least for now. Id. at 320–26.

[15] Id. at 308.

[16] Id. at 309 (citation modified).

[17] Id. (citation modified).

[18] Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719–20 (Minn. 1986).

[19] See, e.g., Anderson v. Fairview Health Services, Inc., No. A07-1481, 2008 WL 3289269, at *4 (Minn. App. Aug. 12, 2008);

[20] See, e.g., Ridler v. Olivia Public School System No. 653, 432 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. App. 1988) (“[U]nder the MHRA, gender based employment decisions are prohibited regardless whether the victim is male or female.”);

[21] Minn. Stat. § 363A.08.

[22] See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2003) (asserting that race-based college admission programs discriminate against groups with greater representation); What You Should Know About DEI-Related Discrimination at Work, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-dei-related-discrimination-work.

Associated Attorneys